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HIERON AND THE APE IN PINDAR, *PYTHIAN* 2.72–73

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After praising Hieron for his martial courage (*P.* 2.63–65) and βουλαὶ πρεσβύτεραι (*P.* 2.65–67), Pindar hails the monarch with an extended passage which has been noteworthy as a source of difficulty and critical controversy:

> χαῖρε· τόδε μὲν κατὰ Φοίνισσαν ἐμπολάν
> μέλος ὑπὲρ πολιᾶς ἁλὸς πέμπεται·
> τὸ Καστόρειον δ' ἐν Αἰολίδεσσι χορδαῖς θέλων
> ἄθρησον χάριν ἑπτακτύπου
> φόρμιγγος ἀντόμενος.
> γένοι', οἷος ἐσσὶ μαθών. καλός τοι πίθων παρὰ παισίν, αἰεί
>
> καλός. ὁ δὲ Ῥαδάμανθυς εὖ πέπραγεν, ὅτι φρενῶν
> ἔλαχε καρπὸν ἀμώμητον, οὐδ' ἀπάταισι θυμὸν τέρπεται ἔνδοθεν,
> οἷα ψιθύρων παλάμαις ἔπετ' αἰεὶ βροτῷ.
> ἄμαχον κακὸν ἀμφοτέροις διαβολιὰν ὑποφάτιες,
> ὀργαῖς ἀτενὲς ἀλωπέκων ἴκελοι.
> κερδοῖ δὲ τί μάλα τοῦτο κερδαλέον τελέθει;
> (*P.* 2.67–78)

One line about which modern critics are for the most part in agreement is the statement about the boys and the ape in v. 72–73: this is today almost universally taken to be a negative foil, by which the mature judgment of Rhadamanthys, who resists all deceit and flattery (vv. 73–75), is contrasted with the poor judgment of the children, who regard the ape and its tricks as beautiful.[1]

[1] Cf. F. Gedike, *Pindars Pythische Siegshymnen* (Berlin 1779) 81–83; G. Hermann, *Opuscula* (Leipzig 1839) VII, 119–20; L. Dissen, *Pindari Carmina quae supersunt* (Gotha 1847) II, 212–13; F. Mezger, *Pindars Siegeslieder* (Leipzig 1880) 59–60; B. L. Gildersleeve, *Pindar: The Olympian and Pythian Odes* (New York 1885) 264; A. Puech, *Pindare* (Paris 1922) II, 46; E. H. Goddard, "Pindar, Pythian II," *CR* 36 (1922) 105–6; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Pindaros* (Berlin 1922) 290; W. Schadewaldt, *Der Aufbau des pindarischen Epinikions* (Halle 1928) 331; W. C. McDermott, "The Ape in Greek Literature," *TAPA* 66 (1935) 169–70; E. des Places, S.J., *Le pronom chez Pindare* (Paris 1947) 73n. 1; J. H. Finley, Jr., *Pindar and Aeschylus* (Cambridge, Mass. 1955) 96–97; R. W. B. Burton, *Pindar's Pythian Odes* (Oxford 1962) 126–27; E. Thummer, "Die zweite pythische Ode Pindars," *RhM* 115 (1972) 299; H. Lloyd-Jones, "Modern Interpretations of Pindar: The Second Pythian and Seventh Nemean Odes," *JHS* 93 (1973) 124; J. Péron, "Pindare et Hiéron dans la II[e] Pythique," *REG* 87 (1974) 29; T. N. Gantz, "Pindar's Second Pythian: The Myth of Ixion," *Hermes* 106 (1978) 24–25; C. Carey, *A Commentary on Five Odes of Pindar* (Salem, N.H. 1981) 53–55; R. Stoneman, "The Ideal Courtier: Pindar and Hieron in *Pythian* 2," *CQ* NS 34 (1984) 45; G. W. Most, *The Measures of Praise: Structure and Function in Pindar's Second Pythian and Seventh Nemean Odes* (Göttingen 1985) 104–5. This is also implicitly the view of all those (see note 7 below) who see the ape as a "trickster" or "flatterer." A variation on this view is represented by G. Kirkwood, *Selections from Pindar* (Chico 1982) 155–56, and J. M. Bell, "God, Man, and

On this view, Hieron is being admonished against poor judgment in selecting his advisors and companions. However, a few nineteenth-century critics, including most notably Boeckh, construed the passage quite differently, taking the antithesis to be between the ape and Rhadamanthys, not between the children and Rhadamanthys: the ape stands for the man who allows himself to be deceived by flatterers, with their continual acclamations of καλός, καλός, in contrast to the wise Rhadamanthys, who takes no delight in them.[2] I hope to demonstrate, from relevant literary parallels, as well as rhetorical and contextual considerations, that this second view is indeed the correct one.

The scholiasts' identification of the ape with Bacchylides, a view championed in modern times by Bowra,[3] has caused considerable confusion, and has tended to distort the perceptions even of critics who reject the allusion. Many of those who step back from seeing this passage as a polemic against supporters of Bacchylides in Hieron's court nevertheless still tend to see it as an attack on unworthy courtiers who are, in Pindar's opinion, overvalued by the prince: from this broader construction of the context comes the view that Pindar is admonishing Hieron not to behave like children in judging the ugly to be beautiful, but to follow the model of the wise Rhadamanthys, who can tell the difference. However, Thummer and others have recently argued that we need not see the end of *Pythian* 2 as directed against any specific persons in Hieron's court, so much as against the generic nay-sayers whose *phthonos*, as so often in Pindar's epinicia, forms a resonating springboard against which the poet can assert his own positive praise of the *laudandus*.[4] With the broader context thus reinterpreted, there is no longer any need for Pindar to warn Hieron about his favorites, and

Animal in Pindar's Second Pythian," in D. E. Gerber, ed., *Greek Poetry and Philosophy: Studies in Honour of Leonard Woodbury* (Chico 1984) 18, who see the ape and children together as intellectual inferiors opposed to the wise Rhadamanthys.

[2] Cf. A. Boeckh, *Pindari Opera quae supersunt* (Leipzig 1821) II:2, 250–51, who relies, however, on a mistaken punctuation of the passage; A. Matthiae, *Vermischte Schriften* (Altenberg 1833) 99–100; D. Comparetti, "Zur hermeneutik des Pindaros," *Philologus* 28 (1869) 397; H. van Herwerden, "Pindarica," *Mnemosyne* NS 25 (1897) 41. It has never been noted that this is also the way the passage is construed by the one scholium (Σ*P*.2.132a Drachmann) not infected by the erroneous conception that the ape is Bacchylides: ὡς ὁ πίθηκος ἀκούων παρὰ τῶν παίδων, ὅτι καλός ἐστιν, ἐπαίρεται, οὕτω καὶ οἱ μάταιοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπαίρονται καὶ χαυνοῦνται, ὅπερ τοῖς φρονίμοις οὐχ ἁρμόζει εἰδόσιν ὅτι κατὰ κολακείαν καὶ ἐνέδραν ἐπαινοῦνται, οὐκ ἐξ ἀληθείας. Among twentieth-century critics, L. Woodbury, "The Epilogue of Pindar's *Second Pythian*," *TAPA* 76 (1945) 16–17, 21–23, is alone in seeing the ape as the term contrasted with Rhadamanthys, but he errs in seeing the opposition as one between the ape's trickery and Rhadamanthys' virtue; since he sees the ape as the trickster and flatterer (rather than the victim thereof), Woodbury's overall construction of the passage is really much closer to that of the critics listed in note 1 than to Boeckh's.

[3] Σ*P*.2.132c, d, e, f Drachmann, and C. M. Bowra, *Problems in Greek Poetry* (Oxford 1953) 75–81. Bowra is followed by Finley (see above, note 1) 96–97, Gantz (see above, note 1) 24–25, and S. Lilja, "The Ape in Ancient Comedy," *Arctos* 14 (1980) 33–34.

[4] Thummer (see above, note 1) 303–7. Cf. Lloyd-Jones (see above, note 1) 125–27.

the contextual underpinnings for the usual interpretation of the ape-image are cut away. Nonetheless Thummer and others of his persuasion continue to hold it.

Critics have combed the many references to apes in Greek literature to locate parallels for various characteristics which they regard as relevant to Pindar's criticism of Hieron's favorites. Bowra supported the Bacchylides-identification by citing texts on the ape as a mimic or imitator, and arguing that Pindar regarded Bacchylides in this light.[5] Others have criticized this view on the grounds that the parallels are late and that mimicry is at best only a secondary attribute of apes.[6] More popular is the view that the ape is a trickster or even a flatterer, based particularly on a number of passages in Attic comedy, as well as some parallels in late Greek.[7] But the ape is associated with many things in Attic comedy, including ugliness (Aristoph., *Ach.* 120, *Av.* 441, *Eccl.* 1072), short stature (*Ran.* 707), barbarian speech (*Ach.* 120), Spartans (*Pax* 1065–66), demagogy (*Ran.* 1085), general mischief (*Ach.* 907), cowardice and bastardy (Phrynichus fr. 21 *PCG*). Indeed, we can at most conclude only that "ape" was a general term of comic abuse that was not necessarily intended to evoke any special association, whether with deceit[8] or flattery[9] or any other quality. Even

[5] Bowra (see above, note 3) 75, relying principally on Galen, *De Usu Part.* 1.22; Lucian, *Pisc.* 36; Oppian, *Cyn.* 2.605; Aelian, *NA* 5.26; Seneca, *Contr.* 9.3; Harpocration, s.v. τραγικὸς πίθηκος. On the ape's imitativeness, see also McDermott (see above, note 1) 166, who, however, takes this passage differently.

[6] Bowra's view is criticized especially by Woodbury (see above, note 2) 23, Burton (see above, note 1) 126–27, Kirkwood (see above, note 1) 155–56, Most (see above, note 1) 104.

[7] For the ape here as a "flatterer," cf. Gedike (see above, note 1) 81–82; C. A. M. Fennell, *Pindar: The Olympian and Pythian Odes* (Cambridge 1893) 168; L. R. Farnell, *The Works of Pindar* (London 1932) I, 88, and II, 130; McDermott (see above, note 1) 169–70; Woodbury (see above, note 2) 23; Stoneman (see above, note 1) 45. For the ape as a general "trickster," cf. Burton (see above, note 1) 126–27, and Most (see above, note 1) 104–5.

[8] Σ^{RV}Aristoph., *Av.* 440 defines the ape merely with the general term τὸ πανοῦργον. If one examines in detail the Aristophanic passages alleged to treat the ape as a deceiver, the evidence for the association appears remarkably weak. It may come closest to being associated with deceit in the verbal form πιθηκίζω (*Vesp.* 1290, *Thesm.* 1133) and perhaps in the related noun πιθηκίσμος (*Eq.* 887). But even here, the verb and related noun are just as likely to mean something like "clown around"; whatever element of trickery there is in these three passages is humorous and an *ad hoc* contrivance, not a matter of cool plotting and calculation (which is the kind of deceit critics want to read into the Pindaric passage). Burton (see above, note 1) 126–27, and Lilja (see above, note 3) 31–32, also adduce *Ach.* 907, *Ran.* 707, 1085 as parallels for the ape as a deceiver, but of these the first defines the ape in terms of ἀλιτρία (not a synonym for deceit), the second seems most likely to refer to the short stature of Cleigenes ὁ μικρός (*Ran.* 708), not to his fraudulent doctoring of cleaning ash (hardly an ape-like activity), and the third refers to demagogues as δημοπίθικοι not so much because they deceive people as because they are βωμολόχοι (*Ran.* 1085), pet clowns who entertain the *demos* (like Paphlagon ot the Sausage-seller in the *Knights*). Most (see above, note 1) 105n. 47, is equally wrong to cite Semonides 7.78–82W as a parallel for the ape as a trickster: this passage says nothing about deceit, but refers to the ape-woman's malice and indifference to laughter.

[9] The only certain Old Comic association of the ape with flattery is Phrynicus, fr. 21*PCG*, which calls four demagogues apes, and lists them respectively as δειλός, νόθος, κόλαξ, with the fourth term lost. Obviously the ape is here a

assuming the validity of retrojecting back to Pindar parallels from late fifth-century comedy (an entirely different generic context), no clear picture emerges from comic usage which compels us to give Pindar's ape any specific metaphorical or symbolic significance.

Amid the desperate and often rather distant search for parallels to prove that the ape was a symbol for imitation, deceit, or flattery, critics have perhaps failed to notice the most obvious characteristic of apes, which is their physical ugliness—a repulsiveness only accentuated by their primate resemblance to humans. Their physical appearance is clearly the focus of *P.* 2.72–73, framed as it is by the repetitions of the epithet καλός. It is also the primary characteristic of references to the ape in literary tradition before Pindar: Semonides 7.71–82 describes at length the ape-woman's loathsome appearance (αἴσχιστα πρόσωπα, αὐχένα βραχεῖα, ἄπυγος, αὐτόκωλος), which makes her an "object of laughter" (γέλως) to all men. Her ugliness is combined with a complete lack of self-consciousness, which makes her either unaware of men's laughter or indifferent to it (οὐδέ οἱ γέλως μέλει). Heraclitus, fr. 82D-K says that the most beautiful (κάλλιστος) of apes is ugly (αἰσχρός) in comparison with mankind, and fr. 83 DK amplifies this by saying that mankind is inferior to divinity in the same proportion as the ape is to man in regard to "wisdom (σοφίᾳ) and beauty (κάλλει) and all other things."[10] Again, the ape's ugliness is coupled with intellectual inferiority, which is also emphasized in Archilochus' fable of the fox and the ape (fr. 185–87W). As reconstructed from the parallel Aesopic fable,[11] this tells the story of an ape, who is elected king by the other animals, and a clever fox, who envies the ape-king and lures him into a baited trap, claiming that he has not seized the meat himself because he wanted to preserve it as a γέρας for the king. When the trapped ape calls out to the fox for help, the fox taunts him by commenting on the incongruity of an animal with such a rump being king ("ὦ πίθηκε, σὺ δὲ τοιαύτην πυγὴν ἔχων τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων βασιλεύεις;"—cf. Archilochus fr. 187W). The fable thus reflects not only the ape's physical unattractiveness, but also his naive gullibility and susceptibility to the flattery of the cunning fox (Archilochus, fr. 185.5–6W ἀλώπηξ κερδαλῆ...πυκνὸν ἔχουσα νόον).[12]

general term of abuse for politicians (cf. *Ran.* 1085), and is not chosen because of any specific identification of apes with the four terms listed. McDermott (see above, note 1) 172–73, tries to connect the ape with flattery in *Ran.* 1085, but on this passage, see our remarks in note 8 above. The ape's inarticulate grunts and screams hardly make it an effective symbol either for smooth-tongued court flatterers or popular orators; its associations clearly have nothing to do with language and verbal facility. S. Luria, "Der Affe des Archilichos und die Brautwerbung des Hippokleides," *Philologus* 85 (1930) 1-3, strongly attacks the idea that the ape has anything to do with flattery in Old Comedy, and rather sees its associations with politicians who are upstarts or *parvenus*.

[10] On Heraclitus' use of three-term proportions of this type, see H. Fraenkel, "A Thought Pattern in Heraclitus," *AJP* 59 (1938) 309–37.

[11] Aesop, *Fab.* 83 (Hausrath). For the clear connection of this to Archilochus' fable, see M. L. West, *Iambi et Elegi Graeci* (Oxford 1971) I, 71–72.

[12] The contrast between the fox's cleverness and ape's stupidity in also the point of Aesop, *Fab.* 14 (Hausrath). The ape's intellectual deficiency is often reflected in the fables: see *Fab.* 219, 243 (Hausrath), *Fab.* 360, 363 (Halm).

Given that the fox is clearly used in *P.* 2.77–78 as an image for flatterers who say one thing while intending something else, and given the use of the same epithet κερδαλέον which we see describing the fox in Archilochus, the Archilochean fable seems particularly relevant to *Pythian* 2, and strongly suggests that we see the ape not as a wily flatterer himself, but on the contrary as an un-self-knowing king who is the foolish dupe of flatterers. The relevance of the fable to this context was noted in the nineteenth-century by I. G. Huschke,[13] the scholar who is also responsible for the almost certainly correct emendation κερδοῖ in v. 78.[14] Nevertheless, Huschke's thesis has either been ignored or emphatically rejected by most subsequent commentators.[15] Given this allusion's attractiveness on several grounds, it is difficult to understand why it has found so little favor among critics. The hostility to it may stem from erroneous prejudices against the influence of "sub-literary" genres such as the fable on Pindar's high lyric. But Pindar's rejection of Archilochean invective in vv. 54–56 in no way precludes his being influenced by Archilochean images in creating his own affirmative, encomiastic composition; on the contrary, vv. 54–56 together with *O.* 9.1–2 prove that Pindar was thoroughly familiar with the Archilochean tradition.[16] As Nagy has recently emphasized, blame-poetry exists side-by-side with praise poetry as a necessary and complementary twin, and the fabular *ainos* is the essential instrument of communication for both.[17] The multiple animal images which we find in the epilogue of *Pythian* 2[18] can only point in this direction.

I am inclined to accept Huschke's thesis, at least to the extent of seeing the fable of the fox and the ape as Pindar's direct source here. But even if one refuses

[13] I. G. Huschke, "Dissertatio de fabulis Archilochi," in A. Matthiae (ed.), *Miscellanea philologica* (Altenburg 1803) I, 28–35.

[14] The emendation is printed in almost all modern texts except for those of Schroeder and Snell-Maehler.

[15] It is rejected even by Boeckh (see above, note 2) II:2, 250, whose interpretation of the passage as a whole would be bolstered by it. See also Gildersleeve (see above, note 1) 264; Mezger (see above, note 1) 59–60; O. Schroeder, *Pindars Pythien* (Leipzig 1922) 120, the last two objecting to the offensiveness of the idea that the ape is a symbol for the king. But clearly, it is a negative foil for Hieron—the foil of a king who does not know himself and his limitations, like Ixion (who is also, on at least one level, a negative foil for Hieron—see note 32 below). However, without reference to Huschke, the Archilochean fable has been applied to this passage by des Places (see above, note 1) 73n. 1, and M. R. Lefkowitz, *The Victory Ode* (Park Ridge, N.J. 1976) 26–27 (and by H. D. Rankin, "Archilochus in Pindar *Pythian* 2," *Emerita* 43 [1975] 254–55, who does refer to Huschke), but none of them seems to understand its implications for the interpretation of the passage (Lefkowitz still takes the *kalos...kalos* as reflecting "misjudgement" on the part of the children).

[16] That this fable of Archilochus was well known is proven not only by its preservation in the Aesopic corpus, but also by Aristophanes' allusion to it in *Ach.* 120 (see Σ^{ELh} *Ach.* 120, quoting Archilochus, fr. 187W, on which this line is clearly based).

[17] G. Nagy, *The Best of the Achaeans: Concepts of the Hero in Archaic Greek Poetry* (Baltimore 1979) 222–42, especially 237–40.

[18] We also note the dog-image in v. 82, and the wolf in v. 84. On the animal imagery generally in *Pythian* 2, and its fabular connections, see Burton (see above, note 1) 124, and Bell (see above, note 1) 17–26.

to do so, what the fable does prove, taken together with the evidence of Semonides and Heraclitus, is that the ape was associated with ugliness and stupidity in archaic Greece, and was seen as antithetical to the cunning, sharp-witted fox. The usual view of *P.* 2. 72–73, to the effect that the ape is himself a clever trickster or flatterer, requires that he be identical to the foxes of vv. 77–78; this not only contradicts the whole impetus of the archaic tradition about the ape, but makes for a very curious development of imagery, as the same group of people (flatterers) is successively compared to two very different looking and differently behaving animals, whom we are asked to believe possess exactly the same symbolic significance. Even apart from the fable of the fox and the ape, the imagery would work better if the two animals referred to different people and different qualities.

The parallels which critics adduce to support their association of the ape with trickery or flattery are either uncertain (in the case of Attic comedy) or very late, and thus irrelevant. With the increased trade of Hellenistic and Roman times, more apes may have been imported from the far reaches of Africa and Asia, and trainers may have acquired greater skill in handling them; as audiences became more familiar with an ape's capabilities in performance, it may have come to be associated with mimicry, trickery, and other qualities which were less obvious to archaic audiences who knew apes only as ugly and silly creatures.[19] The archaic literary evidence in this regard is quite clear, and it is this evidence (not late texts such as Lucian, Aelian, or Libanius) on which we must rely in discussing the ape's significance for Pindar and his audience.

Aside from the question of relevant parallels, there are other serious difficulties in taking the ape as a symbol for deceitful court flatterers, and the boys as a negative foil for the king. Is the point of vv. 72–73 that all children actually think apes are beautiful, or is it not rather that children will tease apes by repeatedly calling them "beautiful"? The usual view of this passage requires that the first alternative be true, but empirical observation strongly recommends the second. While there are many animals that might be considered cute or pretty by children or adults, I have yet to meet a child of any age who sincerely believes that apes or monkeys are physically beautiful.[20] Children, like adults, may be entertained by the antics of these creatures, but never show themselves to be under any illusion about the ape's beauty; indeed, it is precisely the near-human behavior of creatures who are so hideous and repulsive in appearance that makes children (and adults) laugh at monkeys and apes. However, one frequently sees children teasing animals or calling them names, often repeating the name until they provoke some response from the creature. I doubt that archaic Greek boys were much different from their modern American and European counterparts in these regards, given that the adult cultural norm then as now was to regard apes as ugly, however entertaining they might be. Indeed, several sources tell us that

[19] For the literary and iconographical evidence concerning trained apes used in performances, see W. C. McDermott, *The Ape in Antiquity* (Baltimore 1938) 137–40. The only clear evidence for such ape-performances dates to the Roman period.

[20] I recall from my own childhood using terms like "gorilla," "baboon," or "monkey" of someone (often an adult authority-figure) whom we considered extremely ugly.

"Callias" was a common nickname for apes;[21] Pindar may mean to evoke this name ironically in saying that children repeatedly call the ape καλός.[22] Galen clearly understood this passage as referring to children's mockery of the ape, since in paraphrasing it he says, καλός τοι πίθηκος παρὰ παισὶν αἰεί, φησί τις τῶν παλαιῶν, ἀναμιμνήσκων ἡμᾶς ὡς ἔστιν ἄθυρμα γελοῖον παιζόντων παίδων τοῦτο τὸ ζῷον.[23]

This interpretation is also supported by the particular verbal formulation of the sentence: the emphatic καλός...αἰεί / καλός is far more likely to represent teasing repetition of this word by children[24] than to mean that every child who encounters an ape without exception insists on thinking it *kalos*—a concept which could better be expressed in other ways. The rhetoric of vv. 72–73 strongly argues against the usual interpretation in all other respects too. If the ape is a symbol for court flatterers, and the foolish children are a foil to the wise Rhadamanthys (and Hieron), it seems strange that Pindar chose to make the ape singular (unlike the plural whisperers of vv. 75–76 and the foxes of v. 77) and the children plural (making an uneven contrast with Rhadamanthys or Hieron): he should rather have said, "apes are always beautiful to a child." As the line stands, it would be better for the ape to form the contrast to Rhadamanthys, and the children to the vague flatterers/slanderers. This is also suggested by the fact that the ape is given semantic emphasis in the line: πίθων is the nominative subject (parallel to the nominative ὁ δὲ Ῥαδάμανθυς beginning the next line) and is framed by the nominative epithet καλός as both the first and last words of the sentence. The children, on the other hand, are bracketed in a prepositional phrase (παρὰ παισίν), which makes it very difficult to see them as an appropriate rhetorical or symbolic counterweight to Rhadamanthys (subject of the next sentence) or Hieron (subject of the preceding γένοι' οἷος ἐσσὶ μαθών). Grammatically, they are parallel to ἀπάταισι and παλάμαις. The positioning of the adverb αἰεί also points toward equating the children's words (καλός...*αἰεί* / καλός) with the whisperers' deceits (ἀπάταισι...οἷα ψιθύρων

[21] Here, at least, we have a solid fourth-century source, in Dinarchus, fr. 67 (Conomis). See also Herodas 3.41, and Hesychius s.v. Καλλίαρ (κ 469 Latte).

[22] Cf. McDermott (see above, note 19) 132–33, and G. Norwood, "Pindar, *Pythian* II 72ff.," *AJP* 62 (1941) 341.

[23] Galen, *De Usu Part.* 1.22. He adds: ἁπάσας μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἀνθρωπείους πράξεις ἐπιχειρεῖ μιμεῖσθαι, σφάλλεται δ' ἐν αὐταῖς ἐπὶ τὸ γελοῖον. While Galen's explanations of the children's laughter by the ape's mimcry is probably his own idea, based on the animal's associations in his own time (see above), it is quite clear that he reads the passage to mean that the children's attitude toward the ape is one of superior derision, not genuine admiration.

[24] Pindar elsewhere notes children's fondness for repetition, with the image of the nurse repeating "Διὸς Κόρινθος" to children (*N.* 7.105). There, as here, the repetition signifies mindless twaddle, and illustrates the danger inherent in the poet's dilating on an encomiastic topic too long (see below). Those who want this passage to represent sincere admiration on the part of the children (cf. Hermann [above note 1] 120, or W. Schmid, "Zu Pindaros Pythia 2, 72," *Philologus* 73 [1915] 446–47) cite texts such as Theocritus 8.73 or Callimachus, *Ep.* 28.5, illustrating καλὸς καλός as erotic realism. But this comparison moves us from the realm of the unlikely to the truly grotesque.

παλάμαις ἔπετ' *αἰεὶ* βροτῷ): clearly, the children are the deceivers, the ape their dupe.[25]

Indeed, the context is the most decisive argument against interpreting the ape as court-flatterers. Courtiers have not even been alluded to by this point in the poem, and are not on our mind when we hear this sentence. Everything since v. 57 focuses on Hieron, who has been directly addressed in the second-person throughout this passage, who is told to learn about himself in v. 72 (γένοι' οἷος ἐσσὶ μαθών),[26] and is then told that it is an ape who is always called *kalos* by children (vv. 72–73). Only the following lines introduce the themes of deceit, flattery, and slander. The famous gnome of v. 72, however we translate it, does not tell Hieron to "know those around you," but to "know yourself." In the context of this line the *kalos...kalos* statement can only be a negative foil to the exhorted self-knowledge: someone who is always called *kalos* (as an ape is by children) will not truly know himself, but will be puffed up with a false self-image.[27] The following sentence contrasts this with the wise, self-knowing Rhadamanthys, who does not take pleasure in deceit (such as the children's insincere praise of the ape). Commentators who take the ape as a deceiving flatterer can do so only by isolating vv. 72–73 together with the Rhadamanthys-sentence, and ignoring the "know yourself" exhortation which introduces the passage.

Our construction of the ape as the un-self-knowing comic butt of the children's mocking flattery[28] gives a much smoother sequence of thought to the broader context as well. The "know yourself" statement (v. 72) is itself prefaced

[25] Carey (see above, note 1) 55, tries to interpret the repetition in the sense, "Children are *always* impressed by the ape; men are *always* tricked by whisperers." But this is not what v. 75 says, even if we read βροτῶν, as Carey wishes. Men are not *always* deceived by whisperers, as the counter-example of Rhadamanthys clearly proves. V. 75 merely says that whisperers always try to deceive men (like the children always mocking the ape).

[26] It does not make a decisive difference for my argument here which interpretation of this much-discussed phrase we adopt (for a brief survey of the various possibilities, see Norwood [see above note 22] 341–43), as long as we do not repunctuate. Comparetti (see above, note 2) 396; Woodbury (see above, note 2) 18–20; A. Luppino, "Esegesi Pindarica," *PP* 68 (1959) 362–63; and Thummer (see above, note 1) 295–96, make a respectable case for taking γένοι'...μαθών as a periphrasis for μάθοις. But my own inclination is to follow the more traditional *apo koinou* contruction of οἷος ἐσσί with both the verb and the participle: this has recently been defended by Lloyd-Jones (see above, note 1) 124, Carey (see above, note 1) 49–50, Most (see above, note 1) 101–3, and in a modified form, by Péron (see above, note 1) 16–23. The parallel of Aesch., *PV* 309–10, γίγνωσκε σαυτὸν καὶ μεθάρμοσαι τρόπους / νέους suggests that the Delphic "know thyself" (i.e., know your limitations) could be coupled with an exhortation to behave accordingly; compare also Heraclitus, fr. 116D-K, ἀνθρώποισι πᾶσι μέτεστι γινώσκειν ἑωυτοὺς καὶ σωφρονεῖν.

[27] For the same opposition between Delphic self-knowledge and flattery, see Xenophon, *Cyr.* 7.2.20–25; Seneca, *Ep.* 59.12–14; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 67.361R. The thought may have been traditional.

[28] It is interesting to note that Plato, *Philebus* 48C–E defines τὸ γελοῖον as the opposite of the Delphic "know thyself": the laughable man is the one who supposes himself richer, more beautiful, or more virtuous than he actually is. Pindar clearly evokes the same concept here, in making the ape a paradigm for both τὸ γελοῖον (as it is also in Semonides and Archilochus) and lack of self-knowledge.

by an exhortation to Hieron to receive and examine the present ode as cargo from overseas (vv. 67–71);[29] the implication must be that Hieron is to learn about himself from Pindar's poem. Pindar defends his didactic intent in an epinician ode of praise by implying that mere praise by itself is like the repetition of καλός...αἰεί / καλός, and is no more sincere than the mocking praise of children for an ape whom they actually think is ugly (vv. 72–73). Hieron should certainly not follow the ape in desiring such one-dimensional flattery, but should be like Rhadamanthys (vv. 73–75)—a true king and a wise man, who does not delight in deceptive praise from people who whisper something else behind his back (like the children who say one thing and think another). In secretly maligning a wise man like Rhadamanthys (or, it is implied, Hieron) who knows what they are up to, the fox-like whisperers of slander ultimately hurt themselves (vv. 76–78; cf. vv. 90–92).[30] Pindar, in contrast, is completely above-board in dealing with Hieron, telling the king what he thinks openly and without pretense: he is open to everyone's view, like the cork floating on the surface of the sea, in contrast with the nets and other fishing gear which is hidden (vv. 79–80).[31] Good men cannot be deceived (vv. 81–82). Pindar will not be indiscriminately enthusiastic like the man who insincerely fawns on all in the same way (vv. 82–83 ὁμῶς μὰν σαίνων ποτὶ πάντας...), or like the children always shouting *kalos*! He would rather be an εὐθύγλωσσος ἀνήρ under any government, openly a friend to his friends and an enemy to his enemies (vv. 83–88).

The whole passage thus serves to assert the poet's sincerity in his ode of praise for Hieron, and to deny that his ode is merely another instance of the usual insincere flattery by people who say one thing and think another (or who say one thing to the king's face and something else behind his back). Pindar articulates a doctrine of mimetic realism (through which the king learns from the ode what kind of man he really is) as opposed to empty encomiastic rhetoric devoid of truth or conviction (καλός...αἰεί / καλός). Pindar's didactic frankness, which includes some elements of admonition to Hieron (as in the Ixion-myth)[32] as well as praise, occupies a median position (that of *kairos*) between

[29] The present ode is probably also to be identified with τὸ Καστόρειον in vv. 69–71. In addition to the earlier commentators listed by Lloyd-Jones (see above, note 1) 123, see Thummer (see above, note 1) 299, Carey (see above, note 1) 47–48, Kirkwood (see above, note 1) 154, and Most (see above, note 1) 100–1.

[30] I follow Thummer (see above, note 1) 299–300, and H. M. Lee, "Slander (διαβολή) in Herodotus 7, 10, η, and Pindar, Pythian 2, 76," *Hermes* 106 (1978) 281–83, in construing the ἀμφοτέροις harmed in v. 76 as both the slandered and the slanderer himself. This would be particularly true in Syracuse, given Hieron's well-known use of spies and informers to uncover people's sentiments about him (cf. Aristotle, *Polit.* 5.11, 1313b13–16). On the connection of Hieron's spies with this passage, see Hermann (see above, note 1) VII, 120–21, who, however, wrongly sees the spies themselves as the people under attack here.

[31] For this interpretation of the passage, see Most (see above, note 1) 108–10, and "Two Leaden Metaphors in Pindar *P.* 2," *AJP* 108 (1987) 569–71.

[32] In regard to the Ixion myth, which is, on at least one level, a negative paradigm for Hieron, see T. K. Hubbard, *The Pindaric Mind: A Study of Logical Structure in Early Greek Poetry* (Leiden 1985) 134–40, and "The Subject/Object-Relation in Pindar's *Second Pythian* and *Seventh Nemean*," *QUCC* NS 22 (1986) 55–60.

the extremes of insincere over-praise and whispered slander. The epilogue of *Pythian* 2 as a whole demonstrates that the over-praisers and the slanderers are in fact the same people. We need not see these people as Pindar's personal enemies at Hieron's court, but as foils to the poet's own ethos of artistic moderation and authenticity. To be sure, Hieron had many real enemies who doubtless did exactly what Pindar describes here. But Pindar effectively feeds and manipulates the monarch's suspicious nature to impress upon Hieron that he, for one, can be genuinely trusted, in contrast to the others.

The concept of encomiastic propriety—praising neither too little nor too much—is an important one in Pindar. Any student of Pindar is familiar with his frequent use of break-off formulae to limit expression on a given topic to boundaries which are sufficient but not excessive.[33] Passages such as *P.* 1.81–84, *O.* 2.95–100,[34] *P.* 8.29–32, or *N.* 7.50–53 all express the idea that too much dilation on the virtues of a *laudandus* or a city can lead to a sense of tedium or satiety (κόρος) on the part of the audience, sometimes even envy (φθόνος).[35] The poetic theory expressed by *P.* 2.72–73 is similar, in that it cautions against over-praise as something ultimately harmful to its object. In Greek ethical thought, the Delphic maxim "know yourself" is preeminently a formula of limitation—"know your mortal limits."[36] By evoking it here, Pindar reminds Hieron that a wise man would not expect further praise, such as to rival the gods. Following directly on Pindar's extended praise of Hieron in vv. 57–67, *P.* 2.72–73 thus serves as a seal to that praise, asking Hieron to recognize its sufficiency, and effectively breaking it off by implying that more extravagant praise would not conduce to the king's proper self-knowledge, but would run the risk of being insincere flattery, like the children's cries of καλός...καλός to the ape.[37] This is far more in keeping with Pindar's usual manner than to suppose that he caps his praise with a finger-wagging lecture on the king's poor judgement in court companions.

[33] For a concise discussion of such *Abbruchsformel*, see E. Thummer, *Pindar: Die Isthmischen Gedichte* (Heidelberg 1968) I 122–25, and E. L. Bundy, "The 'Quarrel Between Kallimachos and Apollonios,' Part I: The Epilogue of Kallimachos's *Hymn to Apollo*," *CSCA* 5 (1972) 87–92.

[34] On the interpretation of this much misunderstood passage, see Bundy (see above, note 33) 89–91.

[35] On the concept of *koros* in Pindar, and its relation to *phthonos*, see H. Gundert, *Pindar und sein Dichterberuf* (Frankfurt a. M. 1935) 67–71, and Bundy (see above, note 33) 89–90, n. 111. Gundert does not, however, see the implications of this relation for the end of *P.* 2.

[36] The basic and original sense of "know thyself" in Greek ethics is "know your limitations." In addition to the passages cited in note 26 and 27 above, cf. Aristophanes, *Nub.* 841–42; Xenophon, *Hell.* 2.4.40–1, *Mem.* 3.9.6–7; Plato, *Ap.* 23A–B, *Charm.* 164D–165B; Aristotle, *Rhet.* 2.21, 1395a23–26; Plautus, *Stich.* 124–25; Cicero, *Phil.* 2.68; Juvenal 11.23–38. See also the discussion of E. G. Wilkins, *The Delphic Maxims in Literature* (Chicago 1929) 49–58. The maxim is sometimes used with special reference to knowledge of one's mortality, as by Menander, fr. 538K, or Seneca, *Cons. as Marciam* 11.1–3.

[37] The notion of excess is inherent in the repetition καλός...καλός, particularly since the second καλός overlaps into the next triad of the poem, thus overrunning the sentence's proper metrical boundary.

To summarize our conclusions, it is better to construe the ape of *P.* 2.72–73 as the dupe of mocking flattery on the part of the children who tease it with the repetition of the epithet καλός. This explanation fits in better with (1) Galen's understanding of this passage (and that of Σ*P.* 2.123a), (2) the use of Καλλίας as a nickname for apes, (3) the evidence for archaic Greek views of the ape, which emphasizes its ugliness and stupidity, (4) the parallel afforded by Archilochus' fable of the ape and the fox, in which the ape is a king duped by the envious fox's flattery, (5) empirical observations of children's reactions to apes, and their behavior with animals, (6) the sentence's grammatical form, with πίθων as a nominative singular (thus parallel to 'Ραδάμανθυς) and παισίν as a dative plural (parallel to the ἀπάταισι and the ψιθύρων παλάμαις), (7) the repetition of αἰεί in vv. 72 and 75, (8) the immediate context set up by γένοι' οἷος ἐσσὶ μαθών, (9) the broader context in which Pindar defends his praise of Hieron and contrasts it with insincere flatterers, and (10) considerations of encomiastic propriety, whereby Pindar sets limits on his praise as appropriate for a mortal *laudandus*. The usual interpretation of this line, which sees the ape as a deceptive courtier unduly favored by the king, runs contrary to the evidence in each of these areas.